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Abstract—With the emerging adoption of deep neural networks
(DNNs) in the HPC domain, the reliability of DNNs is also grow-
ing in importance. As prior studies demonstrate the vulnerability
of DNNs to hardware transient faults (i.e., soft errors), there is
a compelling need for an efficient technique to protect DNNs
from soft errors. While the inherent resilience of DNNs can
tolerate some transient faults (which would not affect the system’s
output), prior work has found there are critical faults that cause
safety violations (e.g., misclassification). In this work, we exploit
the inherent resilience of DNNs to protect the DNNs from critical
faults. In particular, we propose Ranger, an automated technique
to selectively restrict the ranges of values in particular DNN
layers, which can dampen the large deviations typically caused
by critical faults to smaller ones. Such reduced deviations can
usually be tolerated by the inherent resilience of DNNs. Ranger
can be integrated into existing DNNs without retraining, and
with minimal effort. Our evaluation on 8 DNNs (including two
used in self-driving car applications) demonstrates that Ranger
can achieve significant resilience boosting without degrading the
accuracy of the model, and incurring negligible overheads.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, there has been wide adoption of deep
neural networks (DNNs) in the High-Performance Computing
(HPC) domain [1]–[4]. One of the defining characteristics
of DNNs is the humongous data they use, which requires
large-scale HPC resources. Typical DNNs are composed of
a large number of identical neurons that are highly parallel
in nature [5], which maps naturally to parallel processors
such as multi-core CPUs, GPUs, or even specialized hardware
accelerators (e.g., TPU [6]). These hardware accelerators are
mini-supercomputers in their own right. For example, the
Nvidia Orin system, which is a DNN accelerator is able to
deliver 200 TOPS (trillion operations per second) [7].
As DNNs are deployed on HPC systems, their reliability
becomes important [8], [9]. In particular, HPC systems are
vulnerable to hardware transient faults (i.e., soft errors), which
are growing in frequency due to the increase in system
scale (particularly in the HPC domain [10]–[12]). Soft errors
typically manifest as bit-flips in the system and can be induced
by high-energy particle strikes (e.g., alpha particles), transistor
variability, thermal cycling, and malicious attacks [13]. This
is important because HPC applications require not only high
performance, but also high fidelity results. For example, in
the health-care domain, DNNs have been trained to extract
meaningful information from the large amount of historical
data, and hence assist in precision medical diagnosis (e.g.,
detection of atrial fibrillation) [3], [14], [15].
Another emerging example are Autonomous Vehicles (AVs),
in which DNNs are used to provide end-to-end autonomy. An
AV system can be considered as a moving data center that
constantly aggregates the sensory data from the surroundings,
from which the system needs to provide prompt and reliable
results to safely navigate the vehicles. In AVs, hardware
transient faults could result in safety violations such as causing
the AV system to miss obstacles in its path [16], [17]. Further,
many of these applications have to adhere to standards, e.g.,
the ISO 26262 standard [18] for AVs requires that there should
be no more than 10 FIT (Failure in Time), which translates
to 10 failures in a billion hours of operation. Therefore, it is
important to protect DNN systems from soft errors.
Traditional methods to protect systems from soft errors
use redundancy at the hardware level (e.g., Dual-Modular
Redundancy). However, such techniques are prohibitively ex-
pensive, and are impractical to be used in this domain. For
example, the cost-per-unit and computation performance are
of significant importance in the HPC domain. Duplicating
hardware components adds to the total cost of the system,
and requires synchronization and voting. DNN-specific tech-
niques have been proposed to enhance the error resilience
of DNNs [16], [19], [20]. However, they either suffer from
significant false positives (e.g., raise an alarm when there is
no fault present), or require significant implementation effort
(Section VI). Therefore, there is a compelling need for an
efficient technique to boost the error resilience of DNNs.
In this paper, we leverage the inherent resilience of DNNs
to enable efficient fault correction to protect them from critical
faults, by selectively restricting the values in DNNs. Critical
faults are those faults that corrupt the outputs of DNNs,
e.g., cause mis-classification in classification networks, leading
to safety violations. Such failures are also known as Silent
Data Corruptions (SDCs). We propose Ranger, a technique to
selectively restrict the ranges of values in specific DNN layers,
thereby reducing the SDCs due to critical faults.
Ranger dampens the large value deviations to small ones,
which can be tolerated by the inherent resilience of DNNs, i.e.,
DNNs are still able to generate correct outputs. Note that the
values that exceed the restriction bound are not limited to those
corrupted by critical faults. For the values that are corrupted by
faults, Ranger can restrict the ranges of the values to prevent
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SDCs. However, for normal values (i.e., those uncorrupted by
the fault), range restriction due to Ranger will not degrade the
accuracy of the original model (Section III-B).
Ranger is an automated transformation applied on existing
DNN models. Thus, existing DNN applications can benefit
from Ranger, without requiring the retraining of the DNNs.
This is very important as retraining DNNs can consume
significant computational resources, especially for large net-
works used in the HPC domain. Further, the only effort
needed by the programmer to apply Ranger is to provide
representative inputs for deriving the restriction bounds (e.g.,
randomly choose 20% of training data in the dataset), which
are used for range restriction. Finally, Ranger incurs very low
performance overheads in practice (Section IV). Therefore,
Ranger is practical to use in DNN applications used in HPC.
Prior work has used value truncation for different purposes,
such as improving the performance of Machine Learning
(ML) [5], [21]; increasing the robustness of ML models
to outliers [22], and preserving the privacy of ML [23],
[24] (Section VI). However, we leverage value restriction for
improving the error resilience of ML to transient faults. Our
work is inspired by a recent paper by Chen et al. [17], which
distinguishes between benign faults and critical faults based
on the mathematical properties of the ML model to perform
efficient fault injection. However, Chen et al. do not propose
any technique to protect the DNNs from the critical faults.
To the best of our knowledge, Ranger is the first technique to
provide efficient fault correction for transient faults in DNNs,
without requiring significant effort or retraining.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Propose Ranger, an automated technique to selectively re-
strict the ranges of values in DNNs, and transform large
values into smaller ones. Thus, large deviations caused by
critical faults will be restricted, and can be tolerated by
DNNs (due to the inherent resilience of DNNs).
• Present an approach to choose particular layers in DNNs
for range restriction by studying their value dependency, as
well as derive the restriction bounds to be used by Ranger.
• Perform an experimental evaluation of Ranger on 8 DNN
models with a total of 5 datasets (including two DNN
applications in the AV domain). The evaluation demonstrates
that Ranger: 1) significantly enhances the resilience of the
DNNs models - it reduces the SDC rates from 14.92% to
0.44% (in classifier DNNs), and from 23.76% to 2.49% (in
the AV DNNs); 2) does not degrade the accuracy of any of
the evaluated models, and 3) incurs negligible memory and
performance overheads (0.518% on average).
II. BACKGROUND AND FAULT MODEL
A. Deep Learning
Deep learning is a field of artificial intelligence that typically
leverages DNNs to address problems in both classification and
regression. In this paper, we primarily consider convolutional
neural networks (CNNs), a class of DNNs application (others
such as recurrent neural networks [5] are not considered). A
typical DNN uses multiple layers to progressively extract high
level features from the raw input. The primary computation
usually occurs in the convolution (Conv) layer that extracts the
underlying patterns. The results are then fed to the activation
(ACT) layer in which the ACT function is used to determine
how the neuron should be activated (e.g., performing non-
linear transformation). Other layers such as pooling, normal-
ization layers can be added following the ACT layer. The layer
closest to the output is usually called fully-connected (FC)
layer. An DNN model typically goes through 2 phases: 1)
training phase in which the model is trained to learn particular
task; 2) inference phase where the model is used for actual
deployment.
B. Fault Model
In this study, we consider hardware transient faults (i.e.,
soft errors) that occur randomly during the inference phase of
the DNNs. We consider inference phase because DNNs are
usually trained once, while the inference task is performed
repeatedly in deployment, and are hence much more likely to
experience faults during their lifetime, and faults in inference
phase can cause damaging consequences (e.g., cause the AVs
to miss the obstacles in its path; misclassify the “stop” sign
as “yield” sign) [16], [17], [19], [25]. On the other hand, the
training process of the DNN is known to be able to overcome
small noisy data as it is a statistical learning process [5] -
thus faults in the learning phase are unlikely to cause as much
damage as in the inference phase. We assume that faults arise
in the processor’s data path (ALUs and pipeline registers); and
faults in main memory, cache and register file are protected
by ECC or parity [26]. This is in line with previous reliability
studies [27]–[29]. In addition, we assume that faults do not
arise in the control logic of the processor, as that constitutes
only a small fraction of the total area of the processor. We
only consider activated faults as masked faults do not affect
the program’s execution.
In recent work, Oliveira et al. find that the neutron-induced
transient error rate can be as high as 193 FIT (even if ECC is
enabled) on the HPC applications executed on the Knights
Corner Xeon Phi components [11]. Such high FIT clearly
violates the safety standard such as the ISO 26262 (Section I).
We also assume that atmost one fault occurs per program
execution, because soft errors are relatively rare events given
the typical inference time of DNNs. This also follows the fault
models in prior studies [17], [27], [28], [30], [31]. Finally,
we inject single bit flips in the software implementation of
the DNN, as a transient fault is often manifested as a single
bit flip at the software level [32], and studies have shown
that multiple bit-flip errors result in similar fault propagation
patterns as single bit-flip errors that cause SDCs [33], [34].
We discuss the multiple bit-flip fault model in Section V-D.
III. METHODOLOGY
To protect the DNNs from transient faults (particularly
critical faults), we selectively restrict the ranges of values in
different DNNs layers. This technique that we call Ranger,
is based on two properties in DNNs: 1) the monotonicity of
operators in DNNs applications [17]; 2) the inherent resilience
of DNNs to insignificant errors [35].
In this section, we start by discussing how transient faults
result in output corruption in DNNs (e.g., misclassification).
We then explain how the characteristics of critical faults in
DNNs, and the inherent resilience of DNNs can be leveraged
to improve the error resilience of DNNs. Finally, we elaborate
the design of selective range restriction to enable effective
error correction without degrading the model’s accuracy.
A. Fault Propagation in DNNs
Unlike traditional programs in which soft errors can corrupt
the outputs by diverting the control flow [27], [36], faults that
occur in DNNs are typically numerical deviations (e.g., change
of the activation value in the feature map). Even the faults
that modify connections between neurons can be modeled
as numerical deviations. For example, a fault that causes the
DNNs to break the connection between two neurons can be
considered as a 0 value passed between them.
The output quality of the DNNs is determined by the
numerical output. For classification tasks, the output for the
correct label needs to be high, and for the incorrect labels, it
needs to be low. For regression tasks, the output needs to be as
close to the target variable as possible. Therefore, for a fault
to corrupt the output of DNNs, it needs to inflict as large as
possible deviation at the output.
We provide an example on how a fault could effectively re-
sult in a misclassification in an DNN, in Fig. 1. For simplicity,
the figure only shows two hidden layers L1 and L2, where the
colored nodes denote the activated neurons. The darker nodes
are those with larger activation values (e.g., Node 6 has a
larger activation value than that of Node 7). Though the fault is
propagated through all the subsequent connected neurons, not
all of them will result in large deviations - smaller deviations
are not highlighted for simplicity (e.g., fault propagating from
Node 5 to Node 7 because of the weight connection from
Node 5 to Node 7 is small).
In the fault-free execution, the classification result is as-
sumed to be correct, i.e., label A. However, when a fault occurs
during the computation (Node 5 in the centering network in
Fig. 1), it causes a large deviation in the faulty neuron, and
this subsequently results in the output for label B to be higher
than that of label A. This fault thus leads to a misclassification,
and is hence a critical fault. We consider an SDC as any DNN
output that deviates from the correct output of the program,
e.g., an image mis-classification.
B. Intuition behind Range Restriction
Monotonicity. Chen et.al study the mathematical proper-
ties of DNNs, and find that many of the computations in
DNNs (e.g., ReLu, SoftMax, multiply-accumulate (MAC))
exhibit the monotone property [17]: monotonically increasing:
f(xi) ≥ f(xj),∀xi > xj ; or monotonically decreasing:
f(xi) ≤ f(xj),∀xi > xj . For example, assume a fault occurs
at the Multiply application in the MAC operation and two
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Fig. 1. Example of a fault resulting in misclassification and how Ranger
enables fault correction by dampening the error to be tolerated by the DNN.
Darker colors represent larger activation values. Assume label A is the correct
label and B is the incorrect label.
faults x1, x2 occur at different bits and x1 at high-order bit.
The monotone property is satisfied as: |x1wi| ≥ |x2wi|, where
wi is the weight. Therefore, the fault propagation effect caused
by x1 is larger than that by x2 and thus more likely to result in
SDC. This property has been found in the common operations
(e.g., Convolution, ReLu, etc.) employed in common DNN
architectures (e.g., VGGNet, ResNet) by prior work [17].
Thus the fault propagation behavior can be approximated
as a monotone function. This monotone property implies that
for faults to cause large deviation at the output layer, they
should also cause large deviation at the place where they occur.
This leads to the observation that critical faults tend to cluster
around high-order bits (i.e., causing large value deviation),
while faults at low-order bits tend to be masked and not affect
the output. Thus range restriction is analogous to “transferring”
the faults from high-order bits to low-order bits (since the
effect caused by fault is reduced), which can be tolerated by
the model itself.
Mitigating critical faults. Typically critical faults in DNNs
corrupt the program’s outputs by fault amplification, which
would propagate a single fault into multiple values causing
large value deviations. Restricting the values in the DNNs
reduces the deviations caused by the faults, which in turn
lowers the chance of the fault to result in an SDC. This is
because DNNs inherently can tolerate small value deviations
and generate correct outputs regardless. Ranger leverages this
property to prevent critical faults from corrupting the outputs,
while tolerating other faults. We provide an example in Fig. 1,
where the goal of Ranger is to reduce the deviation by the
critical faults (i.e., significant error) into smaller ones (i.e.,
insignificant error). Despite the insignificant errors, the system
is able to generate the correct output due to the inherent
resilience of DNNs.
Maintaining the accuracy of original models. While
Ranger can be used for fault mitigation, it is also important
to ensure that it does not affect the accuracy of the original
models. In our evaluation, we derive the restriction bound
based on the training data, and evaluate the model on a
separate validation set, to represent an unbiased approximation
for test data, i.e., unseen data. While it is possible that Ranger
Derive restriction 
bounds Insert Ranger
Unprotected 
DNN
Protected DNN 
by Ranger
Fig. 2. Work flow of Ranger.
might truncate the values during the fault-free execution, this
rarely happens as the restriction bound collected from the
training data is usually representative of the value ranges
(e.g., in the VGG16 model, only in 5 out of 50,000 cases,
do the values exceed the restriction bound in the fault-free
execution). Moreover, even when the neuronal values in the
fault-free execution are restricted (e.g., the 5 cases mentioned
above), Ranger only truncates the values to the restriction
bound. Such value reduction can often be tolerated inherently
by the DNNs, and does not lower its accuracy (Section IV-C).
Note that we do not require the training data to represent the
faulty outcomes (unlike in prior work [19]), and hence we do
not need to perform expensive FI experiments to use Ranger
(though we use FI to evaluate its coverage).
C. Selective Range Restriction
In this section, we explain how to implement Ranger in
DNNs. The work flow of Ranger is shown in Fig. 2. The
first step is to derive the restriction bounds from the network
through profiling, after which we transform the network to
insert Ranger on selective layers. Finally, the protected DNN
with Ranger can be released for deployment.
Step 1: Deriving restriction bounds. The restriction bound
can be derived from: 1) the function itself, e.g., Tanh function
has an inherent bound of (−1, 1): For these functions, we
do not have to derive the restrction bounds from the ACT
value distribution; 2) Statistical sampling: For functions that
are unbounded (such as the ReLu function that does not have
an upper bound), the restriction bound can be derived from
sampling the distribution of the values in the function, from
which we can choose an appropriate bound. Selection of the
bound can be adjusted based on whether we are willing to
accept accuracy loss for resilience boosting. A conservative
approach is to set the bound to the maximal value such that it
is less likely to affect the accuracy of the model. Alternatively,
we can also choose a smaller bound to gain higher resilience
boosting at the cost of accuracy. We choose the conservative
approach, but also study the latter approach in our evaluation.
Step 2: Inserting Ranger into selected DNN layers. After
deriving the restriction bound, the next step is to apply Ranger
into the selective layers in DNNs. As mentioned, an DNN
typically consists of different layers (e.g., Conv, ACT, Pooling,
Normalization, FC, etc). While these different layers can be
considered for range restriction, we find that range restriction
on the ACT layer is particularly desirable for two reasons:
1) ACT function is used to determine the response from the
neuron’s output (e.g., filtering out the negative output in ReLu
ACT function), this particular feature of ACT also makes
it ideal to be used for “filtering” out the potential critical
faults. For example, an ACT function can restrict a large
output from the previous layer (where a transient fault occurs).
This restriction thus reduces the deviation caused by faults,
lowering the probability of the fault leading to SDCs. 2) ACT
function is frequently used in different layers in DNNs (e.g.,
VGGNet, ResNet, etc), and thus applying range restriction
on ACT function effectively dampens fault amplification in
between layers (as DNNs usually have many layers).
While range restriction in ACT function would limit the
fault amplification effect, it is not sufficient as there are still
computations that occur between ACT functions. A single fault
in these can quickly propagate and be amplified. We provide
an example below to illustrate this problem.
y = Relu2(Conv(MaxPool(ReLu1(x)), I)), (1)
where ReLu1 and ReLu2 are guarded by Ranger.
Let the bounds of them be bound(ReLu1) =
10, bound(ReLu2) = 1000. For simplicity, assume x = [1, 2],
and MaxPool(ReLu1(x)) = 2. Let the Conv layer have n
kernels (we assume that each kernel is a simple 1x1 identity
kernel I), each of which performs a dot-product computation.
Thus the dimension of y is (n, 1).
Assume that a fault occurs at MaxPool function and deviates
the MaxPool’s output from 2 to 1024 + 2. The faulty value
of 1026 subsequently propagates through the Conv layer, and
thus all the elements from y would be affected. In this case,
the fault-free output of y is a n-element vector of 2. Ranger
can restrict the values from 1026 to 1000, thus y becomes a
vector of 1000. Such a large value deviation indicates higher
probability of resulting in SDCs. And thus applying Ranger on
the ACT layer alone is not enough to mitigate critical faults.
By analyzing the value dependency between layers in the
model, we find the restriction bound applied to the ACT
function can also be extended to other functions. Using the
same example above, the bound of ReLu1 is also applicable
to the MaxPool function, i.e., bound(MaxPool(ReLu1(x))) =
bound(Relu1(x)). Therefore, the values from MaxPool should
not be greater than bound(ReLu1) = 10, and thus y will be a
vector of 10 even under the the fault in the MaxPool function,
which has a significantly lower deviation (compared with a
faulty vector with values of 1000). Thus the fault is less likely
to cause an SDC as the limited deviation can be tolerated
by the inherent resilience of DNNs. Therefore, we need to
apply range restriction to selected layers beyond just the ACT
function to effectively mitigate SDCs.
We describe the procedure of applying Ranger to an unpro-
tected DNN in Algorithm 1. The input to the algorithm is the
restriction bounds collected from the profiling process (j pair
of upper and lower bounds in total for j ACT layers). The
resulting output is the DNN protected with Ranger. Line 2
traverses each operation in the network. For each of the ACT
operation, the output of it will be bounded (Line 3-4). For all
the operations that follow (connect to) the ACT operation and
belong to {Max-Pool, Avg-Pool, Reshape, Concatenate}, the
output of them will also be applied with the same restriction
Algorithm 1: Ranger restriction on an unprotected DNN
Input: i← number of operation in the model
j ← number of ACT operation
(lowj , upj)← bounds for the jth ACT op
Output: Protected DNN with Ranger
1: /* Traverse each operation in the network from the first
layer to the last one */
2: for opi in operations in the network do
3: if opi is the jth ACT operation then
4: Bound opi with (lowj , upj)
5: if opi+1 in {Max-Pool, Avg-Pool, Reshape} then
6: Bound opi+1 with (lowj , upj)
7: else if opi+1 in {Concatenate} then
8: Bound opi+1 with
(min(lowj−1, lowj),max(upj−1, upj))
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: return Protected DNN
bounds (Line 5-8). These are the operations where Ranger
can be deployed beyond the ACT operation (i.e., the operators
protected by Ranger remain in the same in the same network).
Note that for the Concatenate operation that concatenates the
output from the previous 2 ACT operation (this is used in
the SqueezeNet model), the restriction bound is derived from
the bounds in the preceding 2 ACT operation: lower bound
= min(lowj−1, lowj), and upper bound = max(upj−1, upj).
The time complexity of the algorithm is O(n), where n is the
network size.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Software Infrastructure
Implementation of Ranger: We have implemented Ranger
using the TensorFlow framework [37], which is among the
most popular framework for writing ML programs today [38].
This allows Ranger to be applied to a diverse set of ML
programs. In TensorFlow, the program is abstracted as a data-
flow graph, which is composed of a set of operators (i.e.,
different functions). Ranger directly modifies the TensorFlow
graph by adding the extra operators for range restriction
(tf.math.minimize and tf.math.maximize), as per Algorithm 1
after deriving the restriction bounds.
Note that Ranger can also be applied to DNNs written in
other ML frameworks such as PyTorch. This is because Ranger
leverages the inherent properties of the DNN model (e.g.,
the monotone property of the DNN components, the inherent
resilience of DNN), which are platform-independent.
Fault injection tool. We use TensorFI 1, an open-source
FI tool for TensorFlow-based programs that allows faults to
be injected directly into the TensorFlow graph [39]. We show
an example of TensorFI’s operation in Fig. 3. The main idea
of TensorFI is to duplicate the TensorFlow graph using a set
of customized operators to perform the fault injection so as
X
+
X
+
Inject 
fault
Original TF graph Duplicated TF graph
(for fault injection)
Fig. 3. Example of TensorFlow graph and how a fault is injected into the
graph by TensorFI. A fault is injected by duplicating the TensorFlow graph, in
which the customized operators support fault injection capability. The nodes
in blue represent the original nodes in the graph, while the nodes in red are
those added by TensorFI for fault injection [39].
not to interfere with the original graph. As the details of the
operations are abstracted from the program in TensorFlow, and
are also platform-specific, we inject faults directly to the output
values of operators in the graph - this is in line with the FI
performed in prior work [16], [17], [19], [39].
B. Experimental Setup
Hardware: Our experiments were conducted on the follow-
ing machines: 1) an Ubuntu Linux 18.04.2 system with, 8 RTX
2080Ti GPUs, 24 CPUs with 256 GB memory; 2) a Fedora
Linux 20 system, 2 GTX TITAN GPUs, 16 CPUs with 256
GB memory; 3) an Ubuntu Linux 16.04 system with 6 CPUs,
1 GeForece GT610 GPU with 16 GB memory.
Research Questions: We evaluate Ranger by asking four
research questions:
RQ1: What is the effectiveness of Ranger in boosting the
resilience of DNNs in terms of reducing the SDC rates?
RQ2: Does Ranger affect the accuracy of the model?
RQ3: What is the overhead associated with Ranger?
RQ4: Is Ranger effective in DNNs with reduced precision
data types?
DNN benchmarks and datasets. In our evaluation, we
evaluate DNNs applications in both classification and re-
gression tasks. In particular, we evaluate 8 different DNNs
comprising of common DNN benchmarks in ML studies
such as VGGNet, SqueezeNet, ResNet. For the DNNs in
regression tasks (where the output is a variable value instead
of a class label), we choose two DNNs applications that can
be used in the AV domain - these are the applications that
can predict the steering angles of the AV. We choose the
Nvidia Dave driving model [40] and the steering model from
Comma.ai [41]. These DNNs applications have been adopted
in real-world vehicles [42] and are thus used as benchmarks
for AV studies [17], [43].
We use standard ML datasets (such as MNist, Cifar-10,
ImageNet) as well as a real-world driving dataset collected
from the images captured by a real vehicle [44]. MNist is
a popular ML dataset consisting of 60000 images of digits
with 10 classes. Cifar-10 dataset contains 60000 32*32 color
images in 10 different classes. GTSRB is a dataset collected
from the real-world traffic sign for classification and it has 43
different classes of traffic signs. ImageNet is a large database
TABLE I
DNN MODELS AND DATASETS USED FOR EVALUATION
DNN model Dataset Dataset Description
LeNet MNist Hand-written digits
AlexNet Cifar-10 General images
VGG11 GTSRB Real-world traffic sign
VGG16 ImageNet General images
ResNet-18 ImageNet General images
SqueezeNet ImageNet General images
Nvidia Dave [46] Driving Real-world driving frames
Comma.ai [41] Driving Real-world driving frames
Fig. 4. Example of SDCs in different DNNs in our evaluation. The first row
gives the input to the DNN, and the second row shows the output by the DNN
due to transient faults.
with more than 14 million images categorized into 1000
different classes.
Table I summarizes the models and datasets in our evalua-
tion. For models using the ImageNet dataset, we report the
top-1 accuracy (i.e., the target label is the predicted class
that has the highest probability) and the top-5 accuracy (i.e.,
the target label is one of the top 5 predictions) [16]. For the
two steering models, we use RMSE (root mean square error)
and the average deviation per frame to evaluate the model’s
accuracy - these are used in AV DNN studies [45].
Note that FI experiments on DNNs are highly time-
consuming - for each input, we need to perform thousands
of FI experiments to obtain a statistically significant estimate
of the SDC rate. To limit the experimental time, we choose 10
inputs per model, and ensure the DNNs are able to generate
correct prediction on these inputs. We perform 5000 FI trials
for each DNN, except for the DNNs using ImageNet, where
we perform 3000 FI trials as they are more time-consuming
(we verified that the results are statistically significant). We
also calculate error bars at the 95% confidence interval.
In our evaluations, we use 32-bit fixed-point data type for
the first 3 RQs (this is more energy-efficient than floating-
point data type [47]). For RQ4, we evaluate Ranger on DNNs
using a 16-bit fixed-point data type.
Deriving Restriction Bounds. In our work, we derive the
restriction bounds from a randomly-sampled subset of the
training set. We choose 20% of the training data from each
dataset. We find that this is sufficient to derive the ranges for
all the DNNs used in our study. For example, Fig. 5 shows the
ranges of activation values obtained when sampling different
amounts of training data on the VGG16 model. The values
1https://github.com/DependableSystemsLab/TensorFI
Fig. 5. Range of value observed in each ACT layer using different amount
of data on the VGG16 network (13 ACT layers in total). A total of 186056
images (around 20% of the whole training set) were used.
are normalized with respect to the global maximal values (i.e.,
maximal values on all the sampling data). As shown, the value
range quickly converges to the global maximal values for all
layers. We observe similar trends in the other networks. This
suggests that the range of values collected from the sampling
is sufficient to characterize the range of values in the model.
Note that deriving restriction bounds is a one-time cost,
and is incurred before the deployment of the DNN. In our
experiments, it took around one hour to complete this process
on the largest network (VGG16) in our evaluation with around
20% of training data in the ImageNet dataset.
To reduce Ranger’s effect on the model’s accuracy, we
conservatively choose the maximal value observed during the
sampling process as the restriction bound (we study the effect
of choosing other restriction bounds in Section V).
C. Results
RQ1: Effectiveness of range restriction. We measure the
SDC rate, which is the percentage of the transient faults that
cause SDCs, with and without Ranger. For classifier models,
an SDC can manifest as an image misclassification. For the
two steering models that produce continuous values as outputs,
we use different threshold values for the deviations of steering
angles to identify SDCs, namely 15, 30, 60 and 120 degrees as
done by prior work [17]. Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of SDCs
in different DNNs tasks from our experiments.
Note that we only consider those faults that would not lead
to obvious system failures such as a crash (e.g., modifying the
dimension of a tensor might cause an error, and terminate the
program). Though Ranger selectively applies range restriction
on a subset of operations, we consider faults that can arise
randomly in all the operations during the computations except
the last FC layer. We exclude the last FC layer because values
in this layer are directly associated with the final outputs.
Thus, restricting the values in the last FC layer is not effective
in mitigating SDCs (we validated this in our experiments).
However, the state space of the last FC layer constitutes a
very small fraction of the state space (e.g., in VGG16 model,
the last FC layer only accounts for 0.0047% of the state space),
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and techniques such as duplication can be used to protect this
particular layer with minimal overheads.
Fig. 6 illustrates the SDC rates in the 6 classifier models
with and without Ranger. While different DNNs exhibit differ-
ent SDC rates, Fig. 6 shows that Ranger achieves significant
SDC reduction across all the models. For example, in the
LeNet model, the SDC rate decreases from around 20% to 0%
(in our experiments). On average, the SDC rates are reduced
from 14.92% to 0.44% across the models.
The results from the two steering models are shown in
Fig. 7. In the Comma steering model, Ranger can reduce
almost all the deviations of steering angles due to transient
faults and eliminate large deviations (e.g., 0% of SDCs in
the category of threshold=120). However, Ranger achieves
less pronounced SDC reduction in the Dave model. This
is because the Dave model outputs the steering angle in
radians, while the Comma model outputs the steering angle
in degrees. The conversion from degrees to radians is more
sensitive to deviations. This is because the conversion func-
tion (Atan function in TensorFlow) is horizontal asymptote
(y∈(−pi/2, pi/2)), and thus even a small deviation at the input
of Atan function would cause a large output deviation, i.e.,
higher SDC probability. Based on this observation, we train a
new model which outputs the steering angle in degrees instead
of radians, which achieves both better accuracy and better
resilience with Ranger (Section V).
Quantiative Comparison with related work. Hong et.al [13]
suggest a defense mechanism against memory bit-flips by
modifying the ACT functions of the models such as changing
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ReLu into Tanh (a similar approach is also proposed in [48]).
We compare Ranger with the method in Hong et.al for 5 of
the 8 DNNs. The models we consider are: LeNet, AlexNet,
VGG11, Dave and Comma steering model. We only consider
5 models as we need to train a new model for each DNN, and
it is time consuming to do so for the other 3 DNNs.
For both approaches, we report the SDC rate reduction
relative to the original SDC rates in Fig. 8 (for brevity, we
report the average results for the steering models across all
the thresholds). Fig. 8 shows that the approach from Hong
et.al achieves 0% relative SDC reduction in models using
Tanh function. This is because transient faults could occur
after the Tanh function in the network, and are not affected by
the replacement. In contrast, Ranger achieves significant SDC
reduction because it performs selective range restriction in the
entire DNN. For models using the ReLu function, while both
approaches can reduce SDC rates, Ranger enables significantly
higher resilience boosting. For example, for the category of
threshold=120 in the two steering models, the SDC rates in
Hong et.al vary from 4.76% to 9.48%, while with Ranger
the SDC rates vary from 0% to 0.27%, which is an order of
magnitude lower. On average, Ranger achieves more than 90%
SDC rate reduction than Hong et.al across all the models.
Ranger reduces the SDC rate from 14.92% to 0.44%
(34X reduction) for the 6 classifier DNNs, from 24.98%
to 0.49% on the Comma.ai model (50X reduction), and
20.42% to 7.35% (2.77X reduction) on the Dave model.
RQ2: Accuracy. While Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 demonstrate the
effectiveness of Ranger in reducing the SDC rates in DNNs, it
is also important to understand whether it affects the model’s
accuracy. Thus, we compare the accuracy of the original
models with and without Ranger. As mentioned, the restriction
bound is derived from sampling the ACT values from a subset
of the training set. The models are then evaluated on a separate
validation set (e.g., ImageNet validation set that has 50000
images). We report the accuracy of all the DNNs in Table II.
Our results show that applying Ranger does not degrade
the accuracy of the baseline models in any of the 8 DNNs.
This is because the restriction bounds derived from existing
data are sufficient to characterize the ranges of values in the
TABLE II
ACCURACY OF THE ORIGINAL DNN AND THE DNN PROTECTED WITH
Ranger. + INDICATES ACCURACY IMPROVEMENT. HIGHER IS BETTER.
DNN model w/o Ranger w/ Ranger Diff.
LeNet 99.20% 99.20% 0.00%
AlexNet 82.14% 82.14% 0.00%
VGG11 99.74% 99.74% 0.00%
VGG16 (top-1) 64.72% 64.72% 0.00%
VGG16 (top-5) 85.736% 85.736% 0.00%
ResNet-18 (top-1) 62.66% 62.66% 0.00%
ResNet-18 (top-5) 84.61% 84.61% 0.00%
SqueezeNet (top-1) 52.936% 52.940% +0.004%
SqueezeNet (top-5) 74.150% 74.154% +0.004%
Dave (RMSE) 9.808 9.808 0.000
Dave (Avg. Dev.) 3.153 3.153 0.000
Comma (RMSE) 24.122 24.122 0.000
Comma (Avg. Dev.) 12.640 12.640 0.000
DNN. For the rare cases where the normal values exceed the
restriction bounds, the value reduction due to Ranger does
not affect the accuracy. In fact, in the SqueezeNet model,
applying range restriction marginally increases the accuracy of
the model. This is because the large value corresponding to the
incorrect label is reduced by Ranger, and thus the classification
probability of the incorrect label also decreases.
Ranger does not degrade the accuracy of any of the
evaluated DNN models in our experiments.
RQ3: Overhead. We evaluate the runtime overhead of
Ranger in terms of its memory and performance overhead
during the inference phase. The memory overhead comes from
the storage for the restriction bounds, which is proportional to
the number of ACT functions in the models (the restriction
bounds are applicable for not just ACT functions, but also
others such as MaxPool function). Given the typical size of
the DNNs, this memory overhead is negligible (e.g., VGG16
model has a size of over 500MB).
We first measure the absolute runtime of the DNN models.
The average inference time across all the models (using GPUs)
is 9.41 milliseconds (without Ranger) and 9.64 milliseconds
(with Ranger), with ±0.11% standard deviation. Note that the
absolute runtime is highly dependent on the hardware architec-
ture and system configuration. Therefore, for reproducibility
purposes, we measure the performance overhead of Ranger in
terms of the floating-point operations (FLOPs) incurred by it.
FLOPs is a measure of the latency and energy consumption
of ML models [49]–[51], and is independent of the hardware
platform. We use the TensorFlow profiler for this purpose.
The results are reported in Table III. We did not observe
variations across different inputs as they all have the same
dimension. We find that the overhead of Ranger to be very
TABLE III
COMPUTATION OVERHEAD (FLOPS) OF Ranger. M STANDS FOR MILLION;
B STANDS FOR BILLION.
DNN model w/o Ranger w/ Ranger Overhead
LeNet 24.622M 24.722M 0.408%
AlexNet 11.361M 11.468M 0.937%
VGG11 87.057M 87.326M 0.309%
VGG16 309.604B 309.905B 0.097%
ResNet-18 36.354B 36.404B 0.138%
SqueezeNet 530.813M 539.215M 1.583%
Dave 56.545M 56.764M 0.387%
Comma 17.673M 17.723M 0.282%
low (0.518% on average) - this is negligible in most cases.
This is because Ranger only involves range checking and
truncation, which are relatively simple operations, compared
to the typical operators in a DNN. We have only evaluated the
overhead of Ranger on TensorFlow programs - however, we
believe it should be small on other frameworks as well given
the simplicity of range restriction.
Ranger incurs negligible performance and memory
overheads on average across the DNN models.
RQ4: Effectiveness of Ranger under reduced precision
data type. In previous RQs, we used a 32-bit fixed-point data
type, which is more energy-efficient than a floating-point data
type. The data type precision can be reduced to gain further
energy efficiency [47]. Therefore, we study the effectiveness
of Ranger in DNNs using 16-bit fixed-point data type, which
can be used for inference in large DNNs (using smaller data
types such as 8-bit datatype cannot provide enough dynamic
value range for large DNNs [47]). While it is possible to use
quantization such that the same 8-bit data width can represent
larger value range, this is similar to using standard fixed-
point datatypes without quantization (e.g., a quantized 8-bit
datatype can represent comparable range as the unquantized
16-bit datatype). We use 14 bits for integer and 2 for fractional
part, which is sufficient for most common DNNs [47].
As before, we report the SDC rates of the models with and
without Ranger in Fig. 9. As shown, Ranger is effective in
reducing the SDC rate of all 8 DNNs, from 15.11% to 0.93%
(a 16X reduction) even with reduced precision data types.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first study the trade off between accuracy
and resilience in Ranger. We then discuss the design alterna-
tives for Ranger, the limitations of our work, and finally the
extension of our work to the multiple bit-flip fault model.
A. Trade-off between Accuracy and Resilience.
We study how to adjust the restriction bound to gain
additional resilience at the cost of accuracy (e.g., in systems
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Fig. 9. SDC rate of DNNs using 16-bit fixed-point data type. Error bars range
from ±0.04% to ±1.33% at the 95% confidence interval. Lower is better.
that are more prone to transient faults). We focus on the Dave
steering model because as shown in Fig. 7, the average SDC
rate is around 7% even when protected with Ranger.
As mentioned, Ranger does not yield significant SDC
reduction on the original Dave model that outputs the radian
value. Therefore, we train a new Dave model whose output
is the steering angle in degrees. We then evaluate both the
accuracy and SDC rate of the model using different restriction
bound values. As mentioned in Section III, we collect the
distribution of ACT values from statistical sampling, and can
choose the restriction bound accordingly. For example, setting
the restriction bound to the 100th percentile means we use the
value that covers all of the sampled values (i.e., the maximum
value) - this was our earlier approach in Section IV.
Fig. 10 shows the SDC rates of the model with different
restriction bound percentiles, and Table IV shows the corre-
sponding accuracy values. As shown, the SDC rate reduction
due to Ranger is higher than that in Fig. 7, leading to a lower
SDC rate with Ranger. For example, when applying Ranger in
both models, the SDC rate for the category of threshold=120
is 4.01% in the original Dave model, and 2.23% in the new
one. Ranger does not degrade the accuracy of either model.
In addition, the accuracy of the new Dave model is higher
than that in Fig. 7. This is because the new model outputs the
steering angle in degrees, which has a larger dynamic range
than radian values, thereby allowing the model to make more
accurate predictions.
As expected, setting a restriction bound to a lower-percentile
value boosts the resilience but also degrades the accuracy of
the models. When comparing the models using 100% bound
and 99.9% bound, the average deviation per frame increases
from 2.651 to 2.883. However, this provides a higher resilience
boost, e.g., the SDC rate for threshold=120 reduces from
2.23% to 0.27%. On average, choosing the 99.9% percentile
restriction bound reduces the SDC rate from 22.54% to 2.9%,
for the Dave model, with only marginal accuracy loss.
B. Design Alternatives for Ranger
Value replacement strategy: While Ranger restores out-of-
bound values to the restriction bound, we explore other design
alternatives for Ranger based on other work. For example,
Reagen et.al propose to reset the faulty value to 0 upon the
detection of a fault [52]. Similarly, we can restrict all the
out-of-bound value to 0, instead of the restriction bound. We
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TABLE IV
ACCURACY DIFFERENCE OF THE DAVE MODEL WITH DIFFERENT
RESTRICTION BOUNDS. LOWER IS BETTER.
Accuracy Original 100% 99.9% 99% 98%
Bound Bound Bound Bound
RMSE 6.069 6.069 8.5719 12.370 13.940
Avg. Deviation 2.651 2.651 2.883 4.077 4.884
conduct a targeted experiment on the VGG16 model using this
strategy. We observe that resetting values beyond the bound
to 0 significantly degrades the accuracy of the original model
(e.g., 3/5=60% of the inputs are inaccurate after the resetting).
This is because the value reduction is so drastic that the model
is not able to generate a correct output. Further, resetting the
values to 0 is likely to cause 0 values in subsequent operations,
such as multiplication, which can lead to incorrect results.
Another possible strategy is to replace out-of-bound values
with a random value between 0 and the restriction bound. We
perform another targeted experiment where we reset values
outside the restriction range to random values (within the
restriction bound) - we inject 1000 faults for this experiment.
Even though some of the classification results change (where
the incorrectly predicted labels change), the top-1 and top-5
accuracies remain the same. Therefore, the random replace-
ment strategy is also a viable one, though Ranger is much
more deterministic and may be preferred for safety-critical
systems.
C. Limitations
Despite our results to the contrary, Ranger might decrease
the model’s accuracy in some cases, because of the insuffi-
ciency of the data to characterize the unseen data in the real
world. However, there is no easy remedy for this problem and
using a validation set (as per our evaluation) is a common
practice to evaluate the generalizability of the trained models
(in our case, the models are the ones applied with Ranger). For
the rare cases where the normal values exceed the restriction
bound, Ranger still does not degrade the accuracy of the
model (based on our evaluation). Therefore, even if there is
an accuracy degradation in the DNNs due to Ranger in real-
world scenarios, such degradation is unlikely to be high due
to the inherent resilience to insignificant errors in DNNs.
While Ranger enables significant resilience boosting in
different DNNs, even to 0% in some models (e.g., LeNet,
VGG16), we can still observe a small margin of SDCs in
some of the models. This indicates that DNNs systems are still
vulnerable to a small number of critical faults. We attribute this
to the heterogeneous patterns of the critical faults in different
DNNs. In particular, while most critical faults need to result in
large deviations to cause SDCs, this is not always the case. We
can reduce the restriction bound to gain further SDC reduction
at the cost of accuracy as we have shown above.
With the above said, transient faults are relatively rare
events, and Ranger only leaves unprotected 0.44% of SDCs
in 6 of the classifier DNNs and 2.49% in the two steering
models (using degrees in the Dave model), Further, it does not
degrade the accuracy of the original model, incurs negligible
performance overheads, and requires no retraining. Therefore,
we believe it is practical in real-world HPC systems.
D. Discussion for multiple bit-flips scenario
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness of Ranger under
the presence of multi-bit flips. Multi-bit flips will potentially
result in more values being affected than in the single-bit flip
case. However, Ranger will continue to be effective as it is
agnostic to the number of out-of-bound values. This is because
it restricts all the values that exceed the restriction bound.
To validate this, we conducted experiments on two of the
classifier models (LeNet and ResNet) and the two DNNs used
in AVs. We inject multiple-bit flips (ranging from 2 bits to
5 bits) at randomly chosen values. These multi-bit faults can
affect multiple data values - thus they are more potentially
damaging as more values will be corrupted by faults. As
before, we randomly inject 3000 faults per input per model.
The results are shown in Fig.11 and Fig.12. As can be seen,
the SDC rates of the original models increase with the increase
of multi-bit flips without Ranger. However, with Ranger, the
SDC rates are significantly lower, in all cases. While the SDC
rates for the classifier models protected by Ranger remain
relatively constant with the number of bit-flips, the SDC
rates in the AV DNNs increase with the number of bit flips
(although at a slower rate). This is because these DNNs output
the steering angle value, which require exactness (unlike
classifier model that predicts the classification label). Overall,
with multiple bit-flips, the average SDC rate is reduced from
47.55% to 0.87% (55X reduction) for the classifier DNNs; and
from 58.38% to 6.97% (8.4X reduction) for the AV DNNs.
VI. RELATED WORK
Assessing the error resilience of a system is often the
first step towards protecting it. Therefore, there has been a
plethora of work aiming to understand the error resilience
of DNNs via fault injection. Li et al. assess the resilience
of the DNNs by randomly injecting transient faults into the
DNN accelerator [16]. This helps identifying the system’s
resilience under different system design such as the different
layers, datatypes. Reagen et al. build a fault injection tool
to inject faults into the DNNs systems to study the trade
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off between model accuracy and fault rate [25]. Santos et
al. study the resilience of ML application under mixed-
precision architectures [53]. Chen et al. analyze common ML
applications in DNN applications, and identify the monotone
property that constrains the fault propagation behavior in ML
applications [17]. They identify the unique characteristics of
the critical faults in ML applications, which Ranger builds on.
Several techniques have been proposed to enhance the error
resilience of DNNs [13], [16], [19], [48], [52]. For example, Li
et al. [16] leverages the value spikes in the neuronal responses
as the symptoms for fault detection. However, this technique
has a false-positive rate of over 30% [16], and program re-
execution is required upon the detection of a fault. This is
not desirable for time-critical systems such as AVs where
the systems need to generate real-time predictions, and re-
execution might cause delay in response. Similarly, Schorn
et al. [19] builds a supervised learning model to distinguish
between benign and critical faults in DNNs, as well as perform
error correction. However, their technique requires extensive
fault injection (FI), which is particularly time-consuming for
large DNNs. For example, for a single input in the VGG16
model, there could be over 30 million values that can be
corrupted by faults. Therefore, performing FIs to obtain a
comprehensive training set is prohibitively expensive for large
DNNs (such large DNNs are not studied in [19]). Techniques
based on Algorithm-based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) have also
been proposed for detecting faults in particular layers in DNNs
(e.g., Conv layer) [54], [55]. However, it does not account for
the faults arising in other areas of the DNN, and the fault
propagating into multiple neurons. Ozen et al. [56] propose
to embed safety checksums into the network by introducing
a custom regularization term during training. Unfortunately,
their approach requires retraining, which is not desirable for
large networks used in the HPC domain. Mahmoud et al. [20]
use statistical fault injection to identify vulnerable regions in
DNNs, and selectively duplicate the vulnerable computations
for protection. However, their approach incurs high compu-
tational overheads (due to the use of duplication), and also
provides only limited protection coverage. For example, they
find that duplication with 30% overhead only achieves 40%
∼ 70% of error coverage in most of the models (the best
coverage is 90% in the SqueezeNet model). In contrast, Ranger
mitigates an average of 97% of the critical faults in all the
classifier models (achieves a 34X reduction in SDC) with only
0.5% performance overhead, and no accuracy loss.
Many studies have used approximate computing techniques
to lower the computation and energy demands for DNNs [35],
[47], [57]. Leveraging the resilience of DNNs to inexactness
in the computations, these studies propose to identify those
neurons that have low impact on the final output. They
then either replace them with an approximate low-precision
design [35] or even remove them altogether [57]. While our
study also exploits the inherent resilience of DNNs, we restrict
the ranges of values in selected DNN layers rather than find
sensitive neurons in the DNNs like prior studies. Further, our
goal is not to lower the energy consumption or execution time
of the DNN, but to boost its error resilience.
As mentioned earlier, value truncation has been widely used
in the ML domain for various purposes (e.g., performance [5],
[21]; robustness to outliers [22]; privacy [23], [24]). Gradient
clipping is used to address gradient explosion during the
training of DNN by rescaling the gradients to a certain
range [5]. This is because exploding gradient could result in an
unstable network and limiting the magnitude of the gradient
can resolve this problem [5]. Truncated gradient is also used
to induce sparsity in the learned weights of the online learning
algorithm [21]. In addition, the loss function of the model can
also be applied with truncation to improve the robustness of the
learning algorithm [22]. Value truncation can also be applied
to enable privacy preserving ML in the input space during the
pre-processing step [23] or to the gradient values [24] (usually
along with adding some random noise).
Unlike the above papers, we use range restriction for pro-
tecting against transient faults, based on the observation that
abnormally large intermediate values in the hidden layers often
indicate potential output corruption due to transient faults.
In particular, we exploit the inherent resilience of DNNs to
mitigate critical faults while also maintaining the accuracy
of the original model, and leveraging the value dependency
between layers for selective range restriction.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose an efficient resilience boosting
technique for DNN applications used in HPC. We present
Ranger, an automated technique that selectively restricts the
ranges of values in DNNs, in order to dampen the large
deviations typically caused by critical faults leading to Silent
Data Corruptions (SDCs). The reduced deviations can thus be
tolerated by the inherent resilience of DNNs, without causing
SDCs. Ranger can be easily integrated into existing DNNs.
We evaluate Ranger on 8 popular DNN models, 6 of which
are classifiers, and two are steering models used in the AV
domain. Our evaluation demonstrates that Ranger can reduce
the SDC rates of the classifier DNNs from 14.92% to 0.44%,
and those of the steering models from 23.76% to 2.49%,
without degrading the accuracy of the original models, and
incurring negligible memory and computation overheads.
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